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GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE POST-COVID-19:  
TIME FOR A HIERARCHICAL ORDER? 
 
Jean Vilbert 
University of Wisconsin, Madison - Wisconsin, USA 




Abstract: The COVID-19 has renovated the debate about global health governance. Many scholars have proposed that the World 
Health Organization (WHO) should assume the position of a central coordinator with hierarchical powers. This article presents 
four main objections to this project: the problems with ‗one-size-fits-all‘ policies, the heterogeneous distribution of power within 
multilateral institutions, the risks of crowding out parallel initiatives, and the democratic principle. Testing the WHO‘s ability as a 
provider of technical information, an OLS regression, analyzing the first year of the coronavirus health crisis, from January 2020 to 
January 2021, in 37 countries reported in the World Values Survey Wave 7, shows a negative relationship between the population 
trust in the WHO and the number of cases of COVID-19. This indicates that there is a valid case for countries to strengthen the 
WHO‘s mandate, but not to create a hierarchical global health structure. 
  





On 30 January 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the novel 
coronavirus an ‗emergency of international concern‘ and on 11 March, elevated it to a 
pandemic. One year passed, as of 6 June 2021, 172.6 million cases and 3.72 million 
deaths caused by the COVID-19 have been reported worldwide (WHO 2021). For many 
scholars and scientists who have been studying the topic, the world‘s inability to prevent 
the spread of the disease did not come as a surprise. Moon and others, in an article 
published in 2017, pointed out that the world remained ―grossly underprepared for 
outbreaks of infectious disease‖. According to their analysis, previous epidemics had 
shown that the global system for preventing, detecting, and responding to outbreaks 
was not reliable. The point may be that these earlier epidemics - Ebola, Zika, and yellow 
fever - were ‗issues of concern to developing countries and maybe because of this fact 
did not drive great impetus to reforms in the global health system. The COVID-19, 
having hit hard the most powerful nations in the world, might be different. It may 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 7, No. 2, 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 12 
trigger what political theorists call an ‗opportunity window‘ - a rare opening to push 
solutions and produce major changes in the status quo (Kingdon 2011). In this case, the 
willingness to change directs towards a more comprehensive model of global 
governance. 
Authors like Tanisha Fazal emphasize that when the novel coronavirus abated 
over the Western, countries turned to the WHO but did so overestimating the 
organization‘s role and capacity (Fazal 2020). In Moon‘s words, some seemed to think 
the WHO had leverage over the Chinese Government and could even conduct 
independent investigations within its territory to get information about the disease. 
However, the organization has no legal or political power to do so. Put differently, some 
seemed to believe that the world had at hand a hierarchical entity with wide powers to 
address health emergencies when all is available is ‗a loose, flat network‘, a web of 
independent actors negotiating horizontally the norms that regulate their interactions. 
This fragmented picture is a striking feature of the current global health 
governance. In this system, the WHO is not properly a directive coordinator, but one of 
the actors in an archipelago of players. Such ‗unstructured plurality‘ leads Barry Bloom, 
dean of Harvard University's School of Public Health, to argue that ―there‘s no 
architecture of global health‖ (Cohen 2006). Fidler (2007) prefers a metaphor that 
compares this structure to open-source software, which ―becomes a public good 
produced and applied by a broad spectrum of people and institutions with diverse 
interests that improves the more it is used‖. As such, global health governance does not 
flow from organized and centrally implemented authority but from open-source anarchy 
in which governments and non-state actors operate.  
In any case, now that the world may better understand the WHO‘s role in the 
global order, there has been a strong push for a more consolidated architecture; one 
that allows for coordinated global health governance to confront challenges like the 
COVID-19 pandemic. As posed by Gostin (2020a), the question then is what does it 
mean to strengthen global governance? For him, it means that States will have to ―share 
their sovereignty‖ to craft a more robust global system, which keeps partially the 
multipolar architecture, but tailors a position of commandment for the WHO, solidifying 
its global mandate with powers to ensure greater compliance at the national level, and 
political backing to stand up to governments that defy its directives. 
Nevertheless, there are grounds for concern about this process of 
hierarchization in global health governance. This article addresses these issues by 
introducing conditions under which countries may justifiably limit the influx of 
international policies in the health area. It also addresses political questions that can 
undermine the WHO legitimacy and shows why a departure from the current 
horizontally open architecture might not produce the best outcomes. There is a valid 
case for the WHO‘s operations to be strengthened post-COVID-19 but through 
knowledge and resource provision, not hierarchical coordination. In the following items, 
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this study will present a range of reasons why countries, in particular the developing 
ones, should eschew the temptation to create a hierarchical global health structure, 
which may not only fall short due to countries‘ asymmetries but is likely to create losers 
in the process. 
 
CAVEATS FOR A WHO‘S ENLARGED MANDATE 
 
Global governance, as discerns Patrick (2014), is a ―slippery term‖. If in the past it 
denoted a world government, today it refers to a more concrete idea: the network made 
up by governments, international organizations, and other non-state actors to address 
challenges that transcend national borders. This web has sharply expanded in recent 
years, coining multilateral bodies that are far more intrusive than the conventional 
international project (Zürn 2012). Yet, in the face of themes such as global warming, 
nuclear proliferation, money laundering, and pandemics, whose effects are indistinctly 
spread around the globe and resistant to the control of even the most powerful 
governments, many scholars believe that there is no transnational workable mechanism 
able to implement proper measures to ensure efficient outcomes (Nordhaus 2005). The 
novel coronavirus crises may underpin this conclusion. As Frenk and Moon (2013) argue, 
an arrangement robust enough to respond to the challenges posed by the agenda of 
repetitive infections and reproductive health problems demands reinforced health 
structures not only at the national but at the worldwide level - this is the rationale for a 
global health system. 
Still, there are at least four major issues that need to be addressed before 
moving to a model of global health governance that entails, in practical terms, a more 
centralized and hierarchized management, namely: (1) The potential ineffectiveness of 
universalized policies when applied to places with a distinct set of characteristics without 
the necessary adjustments; (2) Legitimacy questions regarding geopolitical stances and 
the balance of power that surrounds multilateral institutions; (3) The possible crowding-
out of parallel initiatives due to the hierarchization of the system; (4) Questions related 
to health often go beyond the WHO‘s scope, some of which may demand specific 
submission to the democratic principle, domestically. 
 
Universal Policies: One Size Does Not Fit All 
 
Since the beginning of the pandemic, the WHO has recommended that 
governments adopt strict rules of social distancing and reduced individual mobility 
(WHO 2021). Such measures are costly and sometimes of questionable efficacy, but 
whenever governments fail to curb the disease through early contact tracing, they are 
left with few options but to concede to them (Vicenti 2020). In this context, like Paul, 
Brown, and Ridde (2020) observe, following the WHO recommendations, and under 
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internal and international pressure, some governors have adopted a set of one-size-fits-
all policies without performing their adapted risk assessment, which can be problematic. 
Far from downplaying the severity of the health crisis, but it makes little sense to 
transfer procedures applied for a country where the median age is forty-five to a 
country with a median age of twenty-five, given the mortality rate of COVID-19 is more 
than sixty times higher among those ages sixty-five or older (Yanez 2020). Before 
incorporating a ‗copy and paste‘ mechanism, countries should consider their 
characteristics as nations, which may substantially affect the efficiency of ‗imported‘ 
policies. 
Peru is an illustrative example of how the lack of adjustment can lead universal 
policies to fail due to contextual determinants. In a piece in the New York Times, Taj and 
Kurmanaev (2020) affirmed that ―President Martín Vizcarra followed the best advice 
when the coronavirus arrived in Peru‖. By that, they mean that he ordered one of Latin 
America‘s first and strictest lockdowns. ―Yet instead of being lauded as a model of 
disease control, Peru has become one of the world‘s worst coronavirus hot spots‖ - 
when the article was written, in June of 2020, Peru had 219 new daily cases per million 
of population, the fourth biggest outbreak in the world (Roser 2021); currently the 
performance of the country is considered by the Lowi Institute the worst among 102 
countries analyzed (Leng and Lemahieu 2021). Then the very article gives the possible 
reasons for the failure: Peruvians were asked to wash their hands and stay at home, but 
only one-third of the poor households have running water, they have little to no savings 
and, even though they were given some money, only half of the homes have a 
refrigerator, which forces families to return day-to-day to crowded markets, a major 
source of infection. The conclusion must be that whether the related social factors were 
not considered in the design and implementation of the policy, actually President 
Vizcarra did not receive, nor did he follow ‗the best advice‘.  
In situations of strong common interest and need for high levels of social 
(international) cooperation, like a pandemic, the much necessary coordination 
comprehensively makes centralized command-and-control instruments much more 
attractive. However, this should not obscure the political common sense that the 
decision-making at the local level is normally more effective (Muller 2018) and that 
‗one-size-fits-all‘ policies usually fail (Mehtar 2020). The reason for that is 
straightforward: each society must adjust solutions to its particularities. For instance, 
cultures considered ‗tight‘ (with strong norms), such as Singapore, Japan, and China may 
have more means to enforce sanitary measures than ‗loose‘ cultures (with higher 
tolerance of deviant behavior), such as those of the United States, Italy, and Brazil 
(Gelfand, Harrington, and Jackson 2017). Moreover, North American and much of 
Western European cultures tend to positively value acts like kissing and hugging, a 
factor of interpersonal transmission of the virus, which is much less common in Asian 
cultures. Policies to be applied to these countries cannot be the same. 
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To counter-argue, one could say that strengthening the WHO‘s mandate does 
not mean that health policies will unavoidably become ‗from top to bottom‘ or 
inflexible. However, historical experience shows that when international organizations 
have sufficient leverage to impose their ‗ideal‘ solutions, they do so. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) is a vivid example of this: whether called to offer technical advice 
and financial assistance to liquidity crises, the IMF has used the opportunity to impose 
broad economic reforms, whose fit was at times highly controversial - in the 1990s, 
acting in Southeast Asia, the Fund tried to follow much of the same guidelines applied 
before in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, even though the 
situation of the Asian countries was drastically different (Feldstein 1998). Nothing 
guarantees that the WHO will not follow the same path. 
 
Legitimacy: The WHO Is Not a Political Island 
 
The same theories of power and principal-agent theory that constraint 
international organizations to follow the commands of powerful states (Bauer 2007) 
apply to the WHO, which cannot be insulated from its political context. International 
organizations are rarely if ever neutral, but part of a complex web of qualified interests. 
Therefore, the risks associated with the WHO falling under the influence of member 
states will be potentialized in a hierarchical structure. This is aggravated by the existence 
of governments that do not share values like transparency and respect for individual 
rights (Raustiala 2016). 
Regarding this last aspect, it is worth remembering that the WHO received great 
criticism, especially but not exclusively from the United States, for its early handling of 
the COVID-19 crisis, when it was accused to let itself be manipulated by the Chinese 
government, having understated the seriousness of the diseased, conveyed 
misinformation provided by Chinese authorities, and praised China for its response to 
the outbreak (Fazal 2020) - the suspicion that an organization may be acting as a 
spokesperson for a country or, worse, as a venue for some governments to influence 
and control policies adopted in other nations is a critical aspect to undermine the 
organization‘s legitimacy in the international order. 
Finally, the somehow old-fashioned division North-South is also an issue here, 
once developed countries still retain a great deal of control over the agenda and interior 
bureaucracy of the WHO (Chorev 2012). In this sense, even though most non-state 
actors are from the Northern portion of the globe as well, the anarchy of competing 
agents at least provides relative open access and facilitates that conflicting interests 
make the apparatus difficult to be controlled by one single entity. Thus, the current 
model might be more democratic than a ‗lord-commander‘ with a formal mandate to 
hold a strong grip over global health governance. 
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Risks of Crowding-Out Parallel Initiatives 
 
There are many reasons to complain about the current global health system. 
Paul, Brown, and Ridde, for example, call for a shift from a reactional archetype to a 
preventive model that adopts a holistic approach to tackle upstream causes and 
determinants of diseases, helping populations to reduce risk factors and augment their 
natural immunity (Paul, Brown, and Ridde 2020). Moon and colleagues do not deny this 
reactionary mode, but add that, inconsistently, the system lacks an emergency culture 
that allows for quick decisions. The final result may be a system that is not robust 
enough to deal with the threats of the present and the future. Nonetheless, it is 
important to notice that the fragility of the system is partially related to current WHO‘s 
institutional problems, such as the vulnerability to the pressure of member states, 
minimal transparency, and little accountability after failure (Moon 2017) which are not 
simple problems to solve and might be intensified with the augment of powers and 
financial resources.  
To make matters worse, elevating the WHO‘s position may crowd out parallel 
initiatives that today are relevant in ameliorating the system, especially those headed by 
non-state actors like the Rockefeller and the Gates Foundation (Andreoni and Payne 
2003), the latter with investments that outspend many governments (Dieleman 2006). As 
Fidler alerts, ―the Gates Foundation will no more march to the tune of WHO than the 
United States will to the cadence of the UN‖ (Fidler 2007).  
Of course, the consequences of non-state actors‘ preferences in terms of global 
health still need to be better understood. According to some positions, this 
multistakeholder governance might be a Trojan horse for the foundations of 
multilateralism (Sridhar and Woods, 2013), a strategy adopted by powerful states to 
neutralize the numerical advantage that developing nations have in the WHO, creating a 
plethora of organizations over which they exercise easier dominance (Moon 
forthcoming). As a counterargument, part of the informational role the WHO can 
exercise (a topic that will be further developed ahead) involves tapping into ‗pet 
projects‘ of non-state actors and report which interest they are serving, such that 
countries and the international community can decide if they make sense in the context 
of a sound strategy for global health. 
 
Risks to the Democratic Principle 
 
According to a critic scholarship, globalization not only restrains the states‘ 
autonomy but also disables democracy by inflicting the convergence of national 
policies. Thus, the structural change in the very nature of sovereignty is an expected 
consequence of the transformation of the fundamental structures of international 
politics, from an anarchic architecture to a global governance system (Zürn 2012).  
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Put differently, in domestic politics, governance is straightforward, once 
exercised by a government vested with formal authority to define and enforce binding 
rules. The international domain, conversely, is composed of independent sovereign 
entities that recognize no superior authority (Patrick 2014). Global governance brings 
ambiguity to this dichotomy. Specifically, in the present case, the tension between 
international order and domestic democracies arises because the consequences of 
health policies can be enduring and countries might have to deal with the side-effects of 
measures imposed by multilateral organizations. For example, the WHO does have a 
scientific basis to advise for lockdowns - which it would secure more energetically if had 
the powers thereof - once researchers have affirmed that ―only strict quarantine 
measures can curb the coronavirus disease‖ (Sjödin et al. 2020). However, countries 
individually must assess adverse effects (Wang 2020), such as depression, anxiety, stress, 
and even suicides (Sher 2020), according to the underlying conditions of their 
populations. Also, at some point, if the lockdowns are not strictly necessary, nations 
should be able to opt for less extreme measures to avoid the general deterioration in 
population mental health (Pierce et al. 2020) - as a social species, humans are negatively 
affected by isolation and loneliness, hypervigilance, and feelings of vulnerability, which 
are associated with increased morbidity and mortality (Hawkley and Cacioppo 2010), 
effects that may last long after the pandemic and the lockdowns have passed. This 
argument now may seem unreasonable, considering the extensive academic support for 
strong mitigating measures against the COVID-19, a disease that has spread across the 
entire globe. The evaluation could be quite different if the spread of the disease was 
limited to developing countries and the WHO was setting tough measures, with 
extraordinary socioeconomic impacts, to contain the virus and prevent it to hit other 
(developed) nations. Granting to the WHO the power to fight pandemics with the 
necessary measures to be effective can have several unintended effects plus some that 
are foreseeable - it would relativize national democracies, especially in countries with 
reduced international leverage (mostly in the global South), in extreme cases 
deactivating the right of peoples to make their own choices about serious and 
controversial matters. Lastly, countries have other interests to balance beyond the 
WHO‘s scope, even during a health crisis. From an economic and political perspective, 
for instance, responding successfully to a pandemic has to mean complementary things 
that involve not only direct impacts (reducing the spread of the virus and the number of 
deaths) but also dealing with social and economic consequences (Roser 2021). 
Illustratively, a response that brings increasing rates of poverty and higher mortality 
from other causes, often associated with economic determinants (Cockerham, Hamby 
and Oates 2017), disproportionally affecting the poorer (Fothergill and Peek 2004), 
cannot be considered successful. All these further problems are not part of the WHO 
sphere and may not be assessed properly in the design provided by well-intentioned 
‘ideal‘ international policies. 
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WHAT IS THE WAY FORWARD? 
 
If a hierarchical global health system presents unintended consequences and 
predicted risks, unilateralism is far from being the solution. It is hard to imagine that a 
country, acting alone, would be able to respond effectively to health threats like the 
COVID-19 in a globalized world. While island states like New Zealand and Cuba can 
control their borders with increased efficacy, most countries are not islands to secure 
mitigation successes through isolationism (Fazal 2020). Additionally, misrepresenting 
caution in terms of embracing policies drawn abroad with unreceptiveness or unjustified 
skepticism can have disastrous outcomes. 
Brazil may be included in this last reactionary category: if the Peruvian 
authorities rushed to emulate policies applied abroad with little or no adjustment, the 
Brazilian federal government refused any advice from the international community. 
(Watson 2020) The administration has never adopted explicitly the Sweden light-touch 
style (McLaughlin 2020), but also did not embrace the WHO‘s guidance (Ferigato et al. 
2020). Under the federal government‘s erratic behavior, subnational powers had to 
undertake most measures against the pandemic. However, the lack of coordination in 
implementing coherent policies may partially explain why the country became the 
world‘s worst COVID-19 hot spot as of March 2021 (Roser 2020). A report from the 
University of Oxford showed that by June 2020, testing in Brazil was infrequent, and 
staying at home for a full fortnight was exceptional, in both cases even among 
potentially infected people. And although the WHO‘s recommendations were not being 
met, at that time many subnational governments were already starting to relax social 
distancing rules (Petherick et al. 2020). 
The contradiction arising from the comparison between the opposite actions of 
the Peruvian and Brazilian governments, which led both countries to similar calamitous 
outcomes - (Brazil with 59.2 thousand cases per million people and Peru with 46.5 
thousand as of March 30, 2021) (Roser 2021) - may be the key to solve this riddle. The 
COVID-19 crisis has cast light on the necessary equilibrium between international and 
domestic orders. States, then, are called to work on this symmetry and build a 
governance landscape that recognizes health as a global issue (Gostin 2020b) but that 
strengths systems at the local level, such that nations can tailor the best policies, 
according to their specificities, to answer to their populations‘ choices and needs (Paul, 
Brown and Ridde 2020). 
It is fair to say that a more robust hierarchized system could potentially offer 
enhanced standards for preventing, detecting, and responding to infectious disease 
outbreaks - it has a higher ceiling under perfect conditions. Yet, conditions are never 
perfect and, besides the grounded skepticism on the efficacy of ‗universal‘ solutions for 
problems embedded in local circumstances; other values are at stake, including the right 
of peoples to self-determination, democracy, and equity. As an illustration, the Institute 
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Lowy classified political systems as democratic and authoritarian and found that on 
average the latter performed better at containing the spread of COVID-19 (Leng and 
Lemahieu 2021) - it is assumed that few academics would support increasing 
authoritarianism to reach effectiveness at managing health crises. At the same time, it 
might be easy for developed states to promote a hierarchical global order knowing they 
will be able to make the most of it - the dangers for their sovereignty and ambitions are 
significantly smaller. However, developing countries are unlikely to receive the same 
package of costs and benefits. 
Drawing these elements together, nation-states should not ‗share their 
sovereignty‘ with the WHO. Governments have a responsibility to be a cushion between 
international policies and the domestic order. In Zürn‘s (2012) reflection, ―higher levels 
of economic openness increase the demand for policies to buffer the less desirable 
effects of world market integration‖. Similarly, higher levels of multilateralism demand 
national governments to filter the less desirable effects of international integration. This 
conclusion applies to a wide range of situations, from foreign aid and investment (with 
possible imperialist hidden purposes) to health-driven intervention and crisis 
management. 
Thus, if the question for the future, as Moon and others perceive, is whether the 
WHO will be mandated and if states will bestow it with greater hierarchical authority, we 
hope the answer is, at least in part, negative. Despite the criticism on the fact that the 
WHO‘s main function today is not as a directing authority, but as an advisor (Moon 
forthcoming), it is possible to adopt a more positive interpretation of this conjuncture 
and advocate exactly for the strengthening of the knowledge-based function. As a fruit 
of specialization, the WHO possesses singular expertise to provide decisive consultancy 
and support (Hawkley and Cacioppo 2010) in the health area, whose beneficial effects 
should not be underestimated. 
Borrowing the concepts and interpretation by Ravallion, a knowledge institution 
can serve as a broker that recruits existing knowledge and conveys it to the needy 
recipients. It can also identify pressing knowledge gaps and sensitive areas of ignorance, 
then producing information to address such flaws. It might seem too little, but the 
information in the context of global health, besides its direct effects and positive 
externalities, can help solve coordination failures stemming from complementarities in 
the decisions and actions of nation-states. A well-functioning global institution, which 
can be the WHO, properly structured to solve deficiencies arising from decentralized 
and fragmented sources of information, can generate economies of scale in knowledge 
development and reduce free-rider problems. This context is auspicious to produce 
efficient coordination and incites broader cooperation (Ravallion 2016). 
Understandably, the current model may sometimes be seen as miscellanea, but 
as Boettke (2021) emphasizes, the difference between bureaucratic and democratic 
administrations is that democracy pushes the decision increasingly down to overlapping 
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competing jurisdictions, while bureaucracy relies mostly on experts immune from 
people‘s engagement. Democratic models are by nature messy but responsive to the 
citizenry. Bureaucracy administration is technical, but when the monopolist expert 
makes an error, there is no mechanism for correction because the decision is from top 
to bottom. And this is not a rebellion against experts. They are critically important to the 
problem-solving process, insofar as within a democratic framework, in which people can 
govern themselves guided by the information they provide. This system does not 
require submission and outsourcing of the decision-making; it informs and qualifies the 
process. 
Against this background, a way forward is to center the WHO‘s mandate in 
developing worldwide mechanisms to make information available and accountability 
possible, by generating and spreading trustworthy knowledge at the global, country, 
and regional levels. In this framework, analytical tools and other simple measures could 
promptly enhance the system, such as: (a) an integrated platform for exchanging 
epidemiological data between governments (Moon 2017); (b) investment in easing data 
collection and transparency, making public the main threats countries face and pose; (c) 
an accredited index of pathogeneses and other risk factors; (d) a catalog of specificities 
of the populations‘ habits and immunity, as well as relevant constraints to plans of 
action. These and other complementary initiatives (e.g. financial mechanisms to 
incentivize countries to report outbreaks rapidly and political instruments within the 
United Nations to hold them accountable in case of delay) would allow for a more 
holistic and preventive approach, which, aligned with technical support and the supply 
of public goods across borders, will result in better coordination and cooperation, with 
political costs and risks infinitely lower than a radical hierarchization of the global 
system. 
Are these improvements enough to deal with threats of the magnitude of the 
novel coronavirus? Critics of the current system will probably say they are far from 
sufficient to equip the WHO for such challenges. Indeed, foreseeing the future is always 
a controversial business. In any case, a straightforward way to estimate what might 
happen tomorrow is to look at what happened yesterday. In the last part of this piece, a 
statistical analysis evaluates how, on average, performed countries during the first year 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the levels of trust in the WHO, with which it is 
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TESTING THE ARGUMENT 
 
If the WHO can play a significant role as a provider of relevant information, and 
this is enough to make an impact in the response against the virus, then countries where 
the levels of trust in the WHO are high should typically perform better. To test this 
hypothesis, we estimate the association between the number of cases of COVID-19 (per 
million people) and the reported popular trust in the WHO in 37 countries - the nations 
that had information about this parameter1 in the World Values Survey Wave 7 (2017-
2020) (Haerpfer et al. 2020). All data that has no other source specifically assigned was 
collected from ‗Our World in Data‘ (Roser 2021). The number of cases per country 
considered the period from the beginning of the pandemic up to January 12, 2021 - 
before the start of the vaccinations, which is one more criterion (a decisive one) to 
differentiate countries and lead to complex results. 
There is no metric to directly state the level of information a country received 
from the WHO and how it was relevant to drive decisions in the context of the COVID-
19 pandemic. To overcome this hurdle, this piece assumes that the popular trust in the 
WHO can serve as a proxy for the level of the organization‘s proximity and how its 
recommendations are circulating in a country. On average, countries where the 
population presents higher levels of trust in the WHO will be the ones where the 
organization has greater penetration and conceivable influence. Conversely, to say that 
policymakers will follow the WHO‘s guidance in such cases would be an extrapolation, 
which makes the metric a suitable middle ground to test not the compliance with the 
WHO‘s policies, but the informational dimension. Therefore, aware of a series of 
variations over time and across countries that can impact individual cases, this method 
still allows for the inferences within the restrained scope of the study, once when 
individual countries are compared with the overall results, it is possible to assert that 
there is no distortion in the findings. 
To prevent omitted factors, control variables were included after the first 
estimation. Model 2 inserts Human Development Index (HDI) and Gini to control for 
economic and socioeconomic variations across countries, which could lead states with 
similar policies to different results. Model 3 includes the percent of the population aged 
65 and above (Aged Pop) and population density (Pop Density), two parameters that are 
considered important to the effects and spread of the disease (Rocklöv and Sjödin 2020) 
and the number of cases effectively reported (Sjödin et al. 2020). Model 4 controls for 
government stringency,2 according to the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response 
                                                          
1
 Egypt, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Macau, Puerto Rico, and Taiwan were excluded due to the lack 
of data in the additional variables described ahead. 
2
 The index sets value between 0 and 100 for each country, considering ten metrics: school closures, workplace 
closures, cancellation of public events, and restrictions on public gatherings, closures of public transport, stay-at-
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Tracker (Hale et al. 2021), and tests for coronavirus per thousand of population, such 
that differences between countries with high and low trust in the WHO can be seen even 
when compared with countries that adopted similar degrees of strictness. Finally, Model 
5 adds trust in science (Science) and obedience to the rules (Compliance),3 to ensure 
that the coefficient on trust in the WHO is not overestimated by the absence of such 
elements of human capital. 
The basic ‗Ordinary Least Squares‘ (OLS) in the more complete step takes the 
following form, where the dependent variable Cases of COVID-19 is the outcome, ßi 
indicates the coefficients for the constant and explanatory independent variable, 𝜋i 
stands for the overall control variables, 𝛾𝑖  represent the two human capital control 
variables, and 𝜀 is the standard error: 
 
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷19
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑊𝐻𝑂𝑖 + 𝜋1𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖 + 𝜋2𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋3𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖
+ 𝜋4𝑃𝑜𝑝𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜋5𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝜋6𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖
+ 𝛾1𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀 
 
It needs to be stressed that the purpose of this analysis is not to estimate the 
effects of the WHO recommendations on the performance of countries that followed its 
guidelines, which would be in some degree contradictory with the argument that 
following the guidance without temperaments may lead to harmful outcomes. The 
underlying hypothesis is that shared resources plus timely, relevant and reliable 
information, once received and adjusted by each country to tailor its policies or 
incorporated by the population itself (to some degree, people can follow the WHO‘s 
guidance regardless of government actions), is a critical aspect in the answer to health 
emergencies and should spark higher levels of spontaneous coordination. As a result, 
better overall performance is expected in comparison to a context of fragmented or 
inexistent information and a lack of instrumented cooperation. It might be a strong 
assumption, but it is a reasonable one, which simplifies the analysis and avoids the 
endeavor to evaluate country by country - in each dimension of the proposed policies 
over time - something extremely complex and subject to multiple measurement errors. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
home requirements, face covering, public information campaigns, restrictions on internal movements, and 
international travel control. 
3
Trust in Science: average answer per country when respondents were asked how much they agree with the statement 
that ―Science and technology are making our lives healthier, easier, and more comfortable‖ — 1 meant ―completely 
disagree‖ and 10 ―completely agree‖ (Question 158); Obedience to the rules: mean answer per country when 
respondents were asked how essential it is, as a characteristic of democracy, that ―people obey their rulers‖— 1 meant 
―not at all an essential characteristic of democracy‖ and 10 meant it definitely is ―an essential characteristic of 
democracy‖ (Question 248). Source: World Values Survey Wave 7 (2017-2020). 
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Table 1 reports the correlations and robust standard errors of the regression of 
the dependent variable (Cases of COVID-19 per million people in a country) on the 
mentioned independent variables, by steps. 
 
Table 1: Results of OLS Regressions 
 












 (119.306) (127.552) (130.313) (113.174) (113.733) 
      
HDI  40565.679 21732.210 -1.24e+04 -2269.826 
  (20856.591) (36437.121) (28150.790) (30181.750) 
      
Gini  461.788 501.259 576.932 912.781
*
 
  (301.720) (282.398) (306.605) (342.450) 
      





   (449.420) (401.721) (400.740) 
      
Pop Density   -5.329 -4.710 -8.007 
   (7.630) (4.230) (4.429) 
      





    (145.697) (155.209) 
      
Tests    22.770 21.266 
    (11.928) (10.397) 
      
Science     7694.414
*
 
     (2830.062) 
      
Compliance     -363.508 
     (1980.095) 
      
N 37 37 37 37 37 
R
2
 0.374 0.473 0.484 0.670 0.710 








In all models, trust in the WHO had a negative association with the number of 
cases of COVID-19. And despite the inclusion of the control variables - potential factors 
that could be hidden in the error term, in that case making the estimation biased - the 
coefficient kept its strength with statistical significance at any alpha level. Being a level-
level model, but considering that ‗Trust WHO‘ is reported in a percent scale, each 
percentage point increase in the trust in the WHO in a country was associated with a 
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decrease, on average, of 455 cases of COVID-19 per million people, all else equal (β = -
454.666; Robust SE 113.7331; P = 0.000; 95%CI = -688.0271, -221.3049; R2 = 0.7104; F = 
11.18). This negative correlation is depicted in Figure 1, perhaps underpinning 
empirically the WHO‘s ability to develop and disseminate useful knowledge. 
 
 
Figure 1: Trust in the WHO and Case of Coronavirus (Feb/2020 - Jan/2021) 
 
An interesting aspect of the graph above is that the observation for the United 
States, the highlighted dot in the upper center of the graph, presents a high positive 
residual that is; the United States (US) performs much worse than the model predicted 
according to the popular level of trust in the WHO in the country. With no intention to 
assert causality, it is worth remembering that the Trump administration withdrew from 
the WHO amid the crisis (Gostin 2020b), which may help understand the background of 
this abnormal result - in terms of deviance from the prediction. 
From a data analysis perspective, the regression seems to confirm that the 
popular trust in the WHO is a good proxy for countries‘ access to information and 
guidance - the US being an outlier - and suggests that countries that are likely to be 
more closely tied to the global health network (again, assumed by the higher level of 
popular trust in the WHO) performed better in the first year of the pandemic, precisely 
when information was more critical due to the elevated degree of uncertainty regarding 
all the aspects of the pandemic. The R-squared value of 0.7104 reveals a good model fit. 
In other words, the independent variables explain 71.04 percent of the variation 
observed in the dependent variable - the number of cases of COVID-19.  
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There is not a threshold that determines automatically when a regression is 
good enough, but data from observational studies, such as the present, might be taken 
as evidence of a useful regression when the R-squared is at least 30 percent (Veaux, 
Velleman and Bock 2020).  
A question that arises is whether this finding is not persuasive to grant the WHO 
the authority it needs to exert a more directive role in global governance. For the WHO 
does not have the power to sanction states for reporting failures, China lagged to report 
SARS; Saudi Arabia to report MERS; Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea were slow to 
report Ebola (Fazal 2020). Even though most nations benefit from it, the dynamics of 
open-source anarchy allow states and non-state actors to resist international rules and 
pose risks to the whole global community. In this train of thought, with more powers, 
the WHO could perform even better. 
Numbers, however, need to be complemented by interpretation to become 
meaningful (Muller 2018). In the present case, the qualitative analysis introduced in 
earlier items shows that despite the essential role the WHO plays in the global health 
governance, which can be improved, a shift towards hierarchization may not augment 
its positive side (Figure 1), but could yet increase substantially the number of 
occurrences like the Peruvian. The argument for knowledge-based coordination, 
providing the WHO the ability to allocate resources and inform decisions, but with no 
hierarchical power, rejects at the same time unilateralism and forced convergence. 
This conjuncture can be also framed within the Pareto efficiency criterion. If the 
WHO is equipped to perform well in its role of supporting countries by delivering 
resources and high levels of reliable and relevant information before and during crises, 
all parties involved benefit. It is a Pareto improvement because it enhances global health 
governance without making non-state actors and developing countries worse off 
(Weimer and Vining 2017). New hierarchical global health governance, in its turn, would 
alter the existing distribution of costs and benefits, in the best case increasing total 
welfare, but potentially hitting non-state initiatives and producing losses to developing 
countries. In this scheme, powerful developed states would likely be in the winner 
group, while developing countries should naturally be clustered among the losers, which 
cannot be considered a Pareto improvement - one could say that this is how rich 
countries find a way to protect themselves against the diseases that come from poor 




There are great political stakes in asserting and, if the case, defining the 
equilibrium between domestic and international orders, a question that comes to light 
and seems particularly relevant in the face of a global disease outbreak, but that extends 
far beyond the health area. The optimal point of international integration raises 
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questions in topics like sovereignty, global security, socioeconomic inequality across 
countries, and the right and duty to humanitarian intervention, just to mention a few. 
Striking a balance between respecting the countries self-determination but, at the same 
time, protecting the interests of the international community is a continuing challenge. 
The debate galvanized by the spread of the novel coronavirus is representative 
of this scenario. Many well-intentioned scholars have proposed a more neat and 
hierarchical global health governance, establishing the WHO as a de jure and de facto 
director of the system. Even though some of the formulations are somewhat cryptic, by 
reading between the lines it is possible to assert that the intention is to create an 
architecture able to bend national states when necessary. This article raises four key 
points that may (or should) prevent this change to happen.  
First, the system would be propitious to the imposition of universal policies 
(one-size-fits-all), with results on the ground that are historically irregular, to say the 
least. Second, powerful governments politicize multilateral institutions, many of which 
are vulnerable to political influence. There is no reason to believe that the WHO will be 
different. Therefore, the intended centralization tends to not be a Pareto improvement, 
because it will create winners and losers, with developing countries at risk of paying the 
price of the reform. Third, a more centralized model of global health governance may 
crowd out important initiatives that today are accomplished by non-state actors. And 
fourth, the hierarchization of the system may disregard democracies and the fact that, to 
some extent, the WHO is unidimensional, while governments are multidimensional - 
they need to decide based not only on immediate health concerns, but considering a 
myriad of factors, both in the short and long run. One of the duties of government in a 
globalized world is to be a cushion between its people and global policies that may not 
be of interest or appropriate to the country‘s specificities. 
This broad criticism does not mean that there are no good arguments for the 
impetus to change the existing model - the academic concerns are legitimate and the 
current system does provide fodder for controversies. In sum, the concerns and the call 
for reform are correct. The solution proposed is deemed to be wrong. Following Pisani-
Ferry's (2018) advice, countries should not invest their hopes in audacious schemes of 
cooperation that may be inefficient. The way forward is to design a sufficient multilateral 
basis for flexible arrangements and to equip policymakers with a toolkit for decision-
making on a field-by-field basis. In this sense, as a knowledge and resources provider, 
the WHO can work in close consultation with national authorities, not as superior, 
helping them to identify the main problems the country faces and what could be the 
best solutions. If the point is to improve the WHO‘s operational capacity and its ability 
to issue technical guidance and coordinate with countries, then there is still room for 
strengthening the organization's mandate. But knowledge must drive its role, not 
hierarchical power. 
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